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Outside the group selection framework, this paper shows how in the presence
of general equilibrium e⁄ects non-individualistic preferences can be individual ￿t-
ness maximizing. We present the argument in the model, where individuals share
among themselves an endowment and use the proceeds either for immediate con-
sumption or for purchase of consumption goods from merchants on the outside
market. Assuming that increased consumption means increased individual ￿tness,
inequity-averse behavior with respect to endowment distribution can be an opti-
mal response to merchants￿price discrimination and, eventually, it can lead to the
evolution of inequity-averse preferences. One of the model￿ s predictions that the
members of a society exposed to external markets behave more pro-socially than
do the members of an isolated society is supported by empirical evidence from the
related literature.
1 Introduction
The conventional assumption of economics that people prefer more money to less has
been cast into doubt by vast experimental evidence. It has been profusely demonstrated
that when making decisions, alongside their own pecuniary interest, people also care,
to a larger or smaller extent, about the well-being of other a⁄ected parties (for a com-
prehensive review, see Fehr and Schmidt (2006)). Furthermore, people￿ s behavior, as
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1documented in numerous experiments, seems to exhibit certain regular patterns such
as, among other things, inequity aversion￿ which is going to be the main object of this
paper￿ described as ￿people are willing to give up some material payo⁄ to move in the
direction of more equitable outcomes.￿ 1 Therefore, as an alternative to the conventional
assumption, inequity-averse preferences have been proposed, which are, in crude terms,
an extension of own-regarding preferences to include inequity-aversion terms (see, e.g.,
Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Charness and Rabin (2002)).
Further research has also showed that the form of revealed preferences (supposedly,
the degree of elicited inequity aversion as well) di⁄er from society to society suggesting
that preferences can be context dependent and shaped by the environment people live
in (for empirical evidence, see Buchan et al. (2002); Henrich et al. (2001); Henrich et al.
(2004); whereas Bowles (1998) o⁄ers a systematic review of related theoretical and empir-
ical literature). The most compelling evidence on between-group di⁄erences in people￿ s
behavior comes from a large scale project conducted in 15 remote primitive societies
scattered around the globe, which is documented in the studies Henrich et al. (2001) and
Henrich et al. (2004). In particular, with the help of experiments, the researchers have
discovered certain regularities in people￿ s revealed amount of sociality, one of which is
that the members of a market-integrated society (as measured, primarily, by a society￿ s
exposure to external markets) behave on average more pro-socially than do the members
of a more isolated society. However, in Henrich et al. (2004, p.50￿ 51) they leave the ques-
tion what explains these regularities open questing for more research on this important
￿nding, and this is where the current paper attempts to contribute.
This paper o⁄ers an evolutionary argument for inequity-averse preferences and shows
how speci￿c situational factors can in￿ uence their appearance. Speci￿cally, we provide
a general-equilibrium framework, where people￿ s preferences for money distribution are
endogenously determined by the speci￿ed economic factors (such as, for example, expo-
sure to external markets). Subsequently, we demonstrate that inequity aversion can be
individual ￿tness maximizing and eventually be favored by natural or cultural selection.
The crux of the presented argument is that in this paper we measure evolutionary ￿tness
not in terms of monetary payo⁄s but rather in terms of the consumption that monetary
payo⁄s can a⁄ord. Since these di⁄erent measures of ￿tness in a general equilibrium need
not to be equivalent, stark di⁄erences in the results can be obtained depending which
measure is used.2
Speci￿cally, we present the argument in a model￿ an extended Dictator Game with
1Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 819)
2In a similar fashion, Huck and Oechssler (1999) develop an evolutionary argument for revengeful
behavior presuming that the individual subjective payo⁄ and subsequent evolutionary ￿tness resulted
from employed strategies are not equivalent. The general models of evolution of preferences (see Ely and
Yilankaya (2001); Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001); Dekel et al. (2007)) also di⁄erentiate between people￿ s
subjective and objective preferences.
2consumption￿ where in equilibrium we obtain that the dictator can be better o⁄(in terms
of expected own consumption) by sharing the monetary endowment with others. As a
simple example, illustrating the main idea of the paper, consider a two-player Dictator
Game with consumption, where the dictator is randomly chosen from the two identi-
cal individuals to divide an exogenously given monetary endowment. While individual
endowment shares are private information, suppose that the endowment distribution re-
sulting from a split is public information. Also, let an individual￿ s ultimate utility be
measured in terms of the a⁄ordable consumption of the only good purchased from a sin-
gle pro￿t-maximizing producer, who charges the price for a unit of the good, produced at
zero cost, that maximizes her pro￿ts from following trades. It turns out that it isn￿ t opti-
mal for the dictator to keep all the endowment with himself, for in that case the producer
targets only the dictator and leaves him no consumer surplus (or rather no information
rent). Instead, the dictator could increase his consumption by giving away to the other
individual a portion of the endowment large enough to make the rational producer set the
price aimed at both individuals, which would leave the richer one￿ the dictator￿ with
some consumer surplus. Hence, from a conventional utility function for consumption we
can obtain a non-monotonic indirect utility function of money that can be interpreted as
having underlying inequity-averse preferences for money distribution, the intuition be-
hind which is that by sharing the endowment one can acquire some information rent and,
as a result, increase the purchasing power of the own share.
Hence, in the presence of general equilibrium e⁄ects individualistic preferences may
not render the highest material payo⁄, or, in other words, may not be favored by natural or
cultural selection, an example of which is presented in this paper. Typically, to show how
non-individualistic preferences survive evolutionary pressures has required either some
group selection argument in standard evolutionary models (for a review, see Bergstrom
(2002)) or certain informational assumptions on the part of players and strategic exter-
nalities in ￿indirect￿evolutionary models (for a concrete example, see Bester and G￿th
(1998); for a more general argument, see, e.g., Dekel et al. (2007)), whereas this paper
bypasses all of the above: the result hinges on general equilibrium e⁄ects. Therefore, this
paper rather falls into the ￿game of life￿paradigm, arguing that people￿ s behavior should
be examined in a wider social context (see Binmore (1994, 1998); or G￿th and Napel
(2006) for an example related to inequity-averse preferences). Finally, this paper adopts
the ￿indirect￿ evolutionary approach (see G￿th and Yaari (1992); Ely and Yilankaya
(2001)) to show that the obtained equilibrium play of the global game is evolutionary
stable; though, the standard approach would render the same results as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 expands the example given above into a
more general model and solves it. Section 3 discusses the obtained results, links them to
empirical studies, and o⁄ers possible extensions. The last section concludes.
32 The Model
2.1 Framework
After the land rewards a group of farmers3 with a publicly observed harvest surplus,
henceforth, the endowment S, the farmers share it among themselves, and, if used for
own consumption, a share x 2 [0;S] renders the material payo⁄of U0(x); U0
x > 0, U0
xx < 0.
Alternatively, in case the group is exposed to external trades, endowment shares can be
used as a means of exchange, i.e., as money, to purchase goods from merchants. It is
assumed that even if shares, resulting from an endowment split, are only privately known,
the ensued income distribution within the group is public information.
Suppose that merchants can o⁄er only one type of goods￿ ￿the good￿ ￿ which, on
the other hand, can be produced of various quality q greater than or equal to some
very small " > 0 (this condition is for modeling purposes as later explained) with the
production function C(q);Cq > 0;Cqq > 0, and the returns to scale from producing a
given variety are constant. Assuming that any farmer has a demand for at most one
unit of the good, and depending on the observed income distribution within the group
and on the outside market structure, as more precisely speci￿ed below, merchants o⁄er
the farmers a menu of price-quality (p;q) bundles of the good to choose from, where
the price p is gauged in terms of the endowment. The consumption of a (p;q) unit
and of the remainder of the endowment share x renders a farmer the material payo⁄ of





qx > 0. The farmer will consider
purchasing the good only if it results in a non-negative net utility level U, de￿ned as
U(q;x;p) ￿ UG(x ￿ p;q) ￿ U0(x), which needs to be greater than or equal to 0 for the
trade to take place. Correspondingly, the properties of the net utility function U are
Ux > 0, Uxx ￿ 0, Uq > 0, Uqq ￿ 0 and Uqx > 0.4 For convenience, let the function U be
of the quasi-linear form in the price p:
U(q;x;p) = V (q;x) ￿ p: (1)
Finally, we shall consider three di⁄erent scenarios of the outside market structure:
1) merchants are absent, i.e., the farmers￿economy is autarkic, 2) there is a monopolist
pro￿t-maximizing merchant, and 3) the outside market is that of perfect competition,
3The ￿farmers￿are chosen to make an allusion to the historical labor division into farmers, nomads,
and merchants, which could potentially serve as a ￿real life￿example in the subsequent argument about
the evolution of inequity-averse preferences for money distribution. In addition, by a ￿farmer￿economy
it is referred to the primitive societies in Henrich et al. (2004), from which comes the empirical support
of the model￿ s results.
4All the listed properties of the utility function U are related to consumer preferences for normal goods
(as in, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). In particular, the positive partial derivative Ux implies that a richer
individual derives a higher utility from the consumption of the good (due to, say, smaller opportunity
costs). Similarly, the positive cross derivative Uqx can be interpreted as that a richer consumer values
quality more, which can be motivated by the convexity of the Engel curves for high-quality goods.
4i.e., there are many competing merchants.
2.2 Game and natural selection
Along the lines of the above framework, consider a large population of farmers randomly
and repeatedly matched to form separate groups of two farmers, and every group is
endowed with the same-size endowment S. In a group, Nature randomly selects a farmer,
henceforth, the dictator, to divide the endowment into shares s 2 [0;S] for herself and
(S ￿ s) for the other farmer. When selected to split the endowment, farmers maximize
their subjective preferences over the endowment split (s;S ￿ s) (or, to put it di⁄erently,
their preferences for money distribution), and these preferences are characterized by the
utility function US with the preference parameter ￿ s 2 [0;S] such that the (subjective)
utility accrued to a farmer-dictator with a preference parameter ￿ s is
U
S(s; ￿ s) = ￿js ￿ ￿ sj:
Therefore, in what follows, a farmer of preference type ￿ s, when sharing the endowment,
will always keep ￿ s for herself, leaving S ￿ ￿ s for the other farmer in the match.5 Next,
suppose that in the population the distribution of subjective preference types is given by
some distribution F over [0;S].
However, the objective payo⁄s from a split, or an evolutionary ￿tness, are measured
by the resulting material payo⁄s U0 and/or UG, which, on the other hand, depend both
on the own endowment share and on the menu of consumption bundles o⁄ered on the
outside market. Importantly, knowledge of other players￿preferences or the population
distribution of preferences won￿ t play any role in this game, which, though, isn￿ t gener-
ally the case (see, e.g., Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) or Dekel et al. (2007)). Next, for
modeling convenience, merchants are assumed to design consumption bundles for every
match separately, and these bundles aren￿ t available for the farmers from other matches.
Furthermore, in what follows, merchants shall behave exclusively in the pro￿t maximiz-
ing way, which implies that merchants￿market structure and their optimal play will be
embedded in the form of the players￿(i.e., farmers￿ ) material payo⁄ function, allowing
us to ￿prune￿the production and consumption stages and to consider the reduced game
only.
As already speci￿ed above, we distinguish three cases of merchants￿market: the
autarky, the monopolist market, and the perfectly competitive market, which give rise
to three di⁄erent material payo⁄ functions of the farmers, and we shall analyze these
5Whereas we are following the ￿indirect￿evolutionary approach (G￿th and Yaari (1992) and Ely and
Yilankaya (2001)), alternatively, we could allow that farmers split the endowment according to some
pre-programmed rule as in standard evolutionary models, see Weibull (1995). Due to the speci￿city of
the studied game, the two approaches would render identical results, which, though, generally is not
necessarily the case (e.g., Huck and Oechssler (1999)).
5three cases in three di⁄erent games ￿A;￿M; and ￿C, respectively. Each of these games
is just a Dictator Game with modi￿ed payo⁄s. In particular, in every game, there are
two players (two farmers), their action space is to choose an endowment share s 2 [0;S]
for himself or herself, and the payo⁄s to the players from their actions are their expected
material payo⁄s (evolutionary ￿tness), as will be de￿ned below. Finally, every player has
subjective preferences over endowment splits characterized by a parameter ￿ s, according
to which he or she divides the endowment.6 Then, for every game examined separately,
we shall tackle the question which subjective preferences yield greater material payo⁄s
and, accordingly, will be favored by natural selection, with their share increasing in the
population at the expense of less successful preferences?
More precisely, we adopt the ￿indirect￿evolutionary approach with a static stability
concept of equilibrium that in the equilibrium no mutation can give a higher payo⁄
than that of the incumbent types. Based on the results of Ely and Yilankaya (2001)
and applying them to our setting, evolution will select those subjective preferences, or,
equivalently, actions over the endowment split, which constitute an equilibrium of the
global games ￿A;￿M; and ￿C, respectively, as more accurately discussed below; and we
shall call those preferences evolutionary stable.7
2.3 Equilibrium play in a match
Case 1: Autarky
Consider game ￿A, where farmers aren￿ t exposed to any external trades, making it
just a standard two-player Dictator Game. The material payo⁄from an endowment share
x is just U0(x), so, given the optimal play of the players (with respect to their subjective
preferences), the expected material payo⁄ to a farmer of preference parameter ￿ s when
matched with a farmer of preference parameter ￿ s0 is
￿(￿ s; ￿ s
0) = 0:5U
0(￿ s) + 0:5U
0(S ￿ ￿ s
0):
More generally, in game ￿A the payo⁄(evolutionary ￿tness) to a preference type ￿ s, given
a population distribution of subjective preferences F, is the average material payo⁄￿(￿ s),
de￿ned as
￿(￿ s) = 0:5U
0(￿ s) + 0:5E￿ s02C(F)U
0(S ￿ ￿ s
0);
6Referring back to the information structure of the model, we could also think of farmers as living
behind the ￿veil of uncertainty￿about external markets, so that they don￿ t have a perfect foresight of
what ￿global game￿they are playing, and, therefore, they just divide the endowment according to their
subjective preferences only.
7Ely and Yilankaya (2001) studies ￿nite games, while in our model the action space is allowed to be
in￿nite: s 2 [0;S]. However, since we design our games in such a way that the existence of equilibrium is
not an issue, then the results of Ely and Yilankaya (2001) apply to our setting as well despite a continuous
action space. Alternatively, we could make our studied games ￿nite by simply discretizing the players￿
action and preference spaces, and then the results of Ely and Yilankaya (2001) would apply directly.
6where C(F) is the support of the distribution F, and E is the expectations operator.
Since the second term of the above ￿tness expression doesn￿ t depend on the own
preference type, the highest ￿tness is attained for the type ￿ s = S because of U0
x > 0.
Hence, the equilibrium of ￿A is the endowment share sA = S, resulting in the endowment
split (S;0), which implies that in such an autarkic setting sel￿sh types would prevail.
Case 2: Monopoly
In game ￿M, to specify payo⁄s to the farmers, ￿rst, we need to solve for the optimal
consumption bundles o⁄ered by the monopolist pro￿t-maximizing merchant. From the
merchant￿ s perspective, it is a mechanism design problem with hidden information, for a
potential customer￿ s wealth, i.e., his endowment share, is his private information. Once
the menu of bundles is set, it is not subject to change, by which we rule out the possibility
of updating the merchant￿ s beliefs about prospect buyers￿wealth distribution after some
trade has taken place (alternatively, we could have assumed that at the last stage only
one trade with a random farmer takes place). The exposition of the merchant￿ s problem
follows closely Mussa and Rosen (1978).
Merchant￿ s problem
Given the publicly observed information about the income distribution followed the
endowment split in the match, which is the probability distribution for the endowment
shares ~ s1 and ~ s2, with ~ s1 ￿ ~ s2, the monopolist merchant designs an assortment of the
good f(pj;qj)gn
j=1, aimed at both (n = 2) or just the richer farmer (n = 1), in order to
maximize his expected pro￿t 0:5(p1 ￿ C(q1)) + 0:5(p2 ￿ C(q2)). Since there is no need
to state the problem and solve it formally, for the solution to this type of problems is
well established in the contract theory literature, see, e.g., the aforementioned Mussa
and Rosen (1978), once the speci￿c conditions are met (e.g., in our model the single-
crossing property is ensured by the assumption of the positive cross derivative of net
utility function U; Uqx > 0). Hence, below we immediately proceed with describing the
results, given various cases of the endowment split.
In the special case of the equal endowment split ~ s1 = ~ s2 = S=2, the merchant o⁄ers
one price-quality allocation (p;q) such that
Cq(q) = Vq(q; ~ s2); (2)
p = V (q; ~ s2); (3)
which coincides with the ￿rst-best allocation in the symmetric information case, where
consumers are left with no consumer surplus.
For an uneven split, ~ s1 < ~ s2, two cases need to be distinguished, when optimally: 1)
the merchant serves both farmers, and 2) the merchant shuns the poorer farmer and o⁄ers
a single allocation only to the richer farmer. When the merchant serves both farmers,
7the optimal price-quality bundles (p1;q1) and (p2;q2) are given by
Cq(q2) = Vq(q2; ~ s2); (4)
Cq(q1) = 2Vq(q1; ~ s1) ￿ Vq(q1; ~ s2); (5)
and the prices p1 and p2 follow from U(q1; ~ s1;p1) = 0, which is the binding individual
rationality constraint of the poor type, and U(q2; ~ s2;p2) = U(q1; ~ s2;p1), which is the
binding incentive-compatibility constraint, respectively. In this case, the richer consumer
enjoys the information rent of the size U(q2; ~ s2;p2), while the poorer is left with none.
The condition for both farmers being served is the quality q1 from (5) being greater than
or equal to ", or ~ s1 ￿ s￿, where the threshold value s￿ is de￿ned as
s
￿ = f~ s1 : ~ q1(~ s1) = "g; (6)
where ~ q1(~ s1) is the quality function with respect to ~ s1 (whereas ~ s2 is replaced with S￿~ s1)
de￿ned from (5), and " > 0 is the smallest quality level that the merchant can feasibly
o⁄er.8
Hence, in case the endowment split results in ~ s1 ￿ s￿, the merchant doesn￿ t serve the
poorer farmer, but instead he o⁄ers the ￿rst-best allocation to the richer farmer as in (2)
and (3), but leaving her with no information rent.
Evolutionary ￿tness
As in the autarky case, in game ￿M the payo⁄s to players, or their evolutionary
￿tness, are the expected material payo⁄s. Given a population distribution of subjective
preferences F, the evolutionary ￿tness of preference type ￿ s is
￿(￿ s) = 0:5Y (￿ s) + 0:5E￿ s02C(F)Y (S ￿ ￿ s
0); (7)
where C(F) is the support of the distribution F, and E is the expectations operator, and
the function Y is the indirect utility function, which measures the material payo⁄ from
the own endowment share, given the optimal play of the merchant. In particular, the
indirect utility function Y of endowment share ~ s (with the other player￿ s share accordingly
being S ￿ ~ s) is de￿ned as




U0(~ s) if ~ s ￿ S=2;
U0(~ s) + U(q2; ~ s;p2) if S=2 < ~ s ￿ S ￿ s￿;
U0(~ s) if S ￿ s￿ < ~ s ￿ S;
(8)
where (p2;q2) is the price-quality allocation aimed at the richer consumer as de￿ned
8Had we q 2 [0;1), then the threshold value, for which still two consumption bundles are o⁄ered,
would not be precisely determined, as wouldn￿ t be then the equilbrium of game ￿M.
8above; and s￿ is the threshold value as in (6) that provides the condition when both
farmers are served.
From the above function￿ s de￿nition, we can observe that for the values of argument
~ s inside the interval (S=2;S ￿ s￿] the payo⁄ function Y takes a form di⁄erent from the
form it takes when the argument is outside this interval. As discussed above, this is due
to information rents available when di⁄erences in endowment shares are not too large,
otherwise, because of the merchant￿ s full-rent extraction a farmer enjoys only her reser-
vation utility U0(~ s). Speci￿cally, there is an upward shift U(q2; ~ s;p2)￿ an information
rent￿ in the value of function Y at the interval (S=2;S ￿ s￿], which results in two dis-
continuities at the points ~ s = S=2 and ~ s = S ￿ s￿, see Figure 1. Since the function
value drops after the second discontinuity point (see for point A in the ￿gure), which
happens when the merchant shuts down on the poorer consumer and strips the richer
one of any information rents, it is not obvious at which point the function Y achieves
its global maximum: at ~ s = S ￿ s￿ (point A) or at ~ s = S (point B). In other words, it
is not obvious from the material payo⁄ perspective whether the dictator should keep all
the endowment with herself, because doing so leaves her without any information rent,
which is otherwise available if she gives away at least s￿ to the other farmer. It depends
on the size of the information rent and the form of the utility functions. Formally, if
U
0(S ￿ s






￿ ￿ p2) ￿ U
0(S); (9)
where (p2;q2)is the allocation aimed at the richer farmer for the endowment split (S ￿
s￿;s￿), then the dictator attains the highest material payo⁄ when she shares the endow-
ment with the other farmer giving the latter the share s￿.9 Intuitively, it is to require
9We don￿ t formally show that or provide a condition when the function Y attains its maximum at
9that farmers after a certain point get quickly satiated with the consumption of their own
endowment shares and value the outside good highly enough.
Therefore, returning to evolutionary ￿tness expression (7), we can see that in case
condition (9) holds the highest expected material payo⁄ is accrued to the farmers of
preference type ￿ s = S ￿ s￿, and, correspondingly, the equilibrium split in game ￿M
is (S ￿ s￿;s￿). In other words, when the farmers are exposed to external trades run
by monopolist merchants, the inequity-averse preferences may get eventually favored by
natural selection, which is to prevent the full-rent extraction by merchants.
Case 3: Perfect competition
Consider game ￿C, where there are many competing merchants on the outside mar-
ket. Given that all merchants￿pro￿ts have to be equal to 0 in perfect competition, the
competitive solution to a merchant￿ s problem is easily described. The o⁄ered quality
level has to be as in the ￿rst-best case, while the price has to be equal to the total cost of
producing that particular quality. Therefore, the price-quality allocation (pj;qj) aimed at
an income level ~ sj is determined by (2) for the quality qj, and the price pj = C(qj), which,
unlike in the monopoly case before, is not a function of consumer preference parameter
(~ sj in our case). Following the same logic as before, it is easy to see that sel￿sh farmers
with ￿ s = S will attain the highest material payo⁄, and this type of preferences should
survive evolutionary pressures.
3 Discussion
The following proposition summarizes the resultant evolutionary stable preferences for
the analyzed environments.
Proposition 1 In the two-player Dictator Game with external trades as studied above,
the evolutionary stable preference types ￿ ses with respect to the endowment S split are
￿ with no external trade ￿￿ ses = S;
￿ with the monopolist merchant ￿if condition (9) holds, then ￿ ses = S ￿ s￿, where s￿
is de￿ned as in (6); otherwise, ￿ ses = S;
￿ with a competitive merchant ￿￿ ses = S:
The main result of this proposition is that external factors, such as market structure,
can have in￿ uence on people￿ s behavior and the shape of their preferences. In particular,
material inequity aversion in money sharing decisions could have evolved as a response to
S ￿ s￿ if S=2 ￿ ~ s ￿ S ￿ s￿, because even if it weren￿ t the case, it wouldn￿ t have changed the following
argument, as long as condition (9) holds for some ~ s 2 (S=2;S].
10some monopolistic powers on the markets. The obtained results can also be interpreted
as even if people are intrinsically sel￿sh (with regard to own consumption), they can
still exhibit behavior as if they have inequity-averse preferences (for money distribution).
Referring to the evolutionary literature of the standard ￿direct￿ approach, the model
argues that in the presence of some general-equilibrium externalities individual selection
can also favor the evolution of other-regarding preferences, showing which has typically
required some form of group selection (see, e.g., Bergstrom (2002)).
Needless to say that within the studied framework with di⁄erent levels of competi-
tion or monopoly on the outside market other forms of evolutionary stable preferences
could emerge. The overall prediction of a more general model would be that the more
monopolist markets are, the less sel￿sh people should become.
3.1 Endogeneity of inequity aversion
The model shows how people￿ s preferences for money distribution can possibly be en-
dogenous to the economic environment they live in. Given that in real life merchandise
markets typically possess some degree of monopoly, the main prediction of the model is
that the members of more isolated societies are less likely to behave pro-socially than do
the members of societies, exposed to external markets. Most importantly, this predic-
tion is consistent with empirical observations on people￿ s revealed preferences for money
distribution, obtained in laboratory experiments run in various countries.
It has been demonstrated that people￿ s preferences underlying their exhibited behavior
in money-sharing decisions are not uniform around the world and are rather shaped by
socioeconomic factors (see, e.g., Henrich et al. (2001); Henrich et al. (2004); Buchan
et al. (2002)). As already noted in the introduction, the most compelling evidence in
support of our theoretical ￿ndings comes from the empirical project run in 15 primitive
societies, which is documented in Henrich et al. (2001) and Henrich et al. (2004). The
aim of this project was to look into the foundations of human sociality and its origins, and
studying primitive societies could possibly shed light on the evolution of people￿ s behavior
in modern civilized societies (where people￿ s behavior is less diverse, see Roth et al.
(1991)). The researchers found that people￿ s behavior as revealed in playing ultimatum,
public good, and dictator games di⁄er across di⁄erent groups, and that there are certain
regularities in the documented di⁄erences. One of the regularities relevant to our model
is that the members of a more isolated society behave less pro-socially than do those
living in more market-integrated societies (as measured by, among other things, exposure
to external markets). This empirical ￿nding is in line with our theoretical predictions
suggesting that our developed model could be seen as a theoretical explanation why
people behave more pro-socially when their economic activity goes beyond their habitat.
113.2 Model extensions and research directions
In practice, within a given society the distribution of people￿ s preferences is more diverse
than just one type of preferences (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). For our model to
achieve a non-trivial distribution of evolutionary stable preferences, we could introduce
some randomness in the structure of the outside market, say, by making it subject to ran-
dom changes from more competition to less competition and vice versa. Then, by putting
the farmers behind a ￿veil of uncertainty￿about the structure of the market, we could
obtain more types than one to survive evolutionary forces, possibly getting the model￿ s
theoretical patterns of preference distribution closer to empirical ones. Alternatively, we
could elaborate the above model by introducing a noisy signal that merchants receive
about the income distribution resulted from an endowment split, which would also allow
us to obtain a more diverse set of evolutionary stable preferences.
In a similar fashion, we can think of other mechanisms a⁄ecting the form of revealed
(inequity-averse) preferences. For instance, within our model, consider the e⁄ect on peo-
ple￿ s optimal behavior after the introduction of a uniform sales tax on the outside good.
If the public authority aims at maximizing tax revenues, then the model would predict
people responding to the tax by reducing inequality in wealth on the grounds similar
to the case with a monopolist merchant. On the other hand, if the public authority￿ s
imposed tax is negligible, then it wouldn￿ t have any impact on people￿ s behavior. In
other words, the importance of the government￿ s role in the economy can also shape the
appearance of people￿ s preferences, with more central role adding to inequity aversion
among people.
An interesting extension would also be to consider an N￿ player Dictator Game, where
the number of farmers, matched to play the Dictator Game, is larger than 2 (similarly
to the framework in Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001)). Qualitatively, it shouldn￿ t change
the results: in certain cases, inequity-averse preferences should still render the highest
material payo⁄. Interestingly, however, in game ￿M it may not be optimal (from the ma-
terial payo⁄perspective) for the dictator to split the remaining endowment evenly among
the rest of the players provided he ￿nds optimal to give away some of the endowment.
Instead, the dictator can do better by dividing the remaining endowment unevenly as it
can be seen from the special case of N = 3 and V (q;x) = qx, which at the same time
poses an interesting question what is the optimal income distribution from the dictator￿ s
perspective in the game with more than two players.
4 Concluding remarks
We have argued that the inequity-averse preferences of the form as documented in labo-
ratory experiments may be a product of natural or cultural selection. Inequity aversion
12to money distribution can be acquired as a response to the existing socioeconomic envi-
ronment, an example of which has been shown in the text, suggesting the endogeneity of
revealed preferences.
The presented ￿ndings can be thought as an attempt to reconcile experimental evi-
dence with the conventional economic theory; though, the question what people￿ s prefer-
ences should be used in economic modeling remains still open. In a partial equilibrium
analysis, using the form of preferences that are most characteristic of the society may
probably render more accurate predictions than using the conventional assumption of
own-regarding preferences. However, if a modeled policy change may have a substantial
general-equilibrium reach, then, along the lines of the presented model, it may also a⁄ect
people￿ s preferences through the social transmission of behavioral traits, complicating
predictions of the modeled change in a longer run.
Surely, more empirical research needs to be done exploring the interdependence be-
tween the environment and preferences. Regarding the ￿ndings of this paper, the link
between people￿ s preferences for money distribution and market structure, as conjec-
tured above, could be empirically more closely examined than it was done in Henrich
et al. (2004), for necessary empirical data can be obtained with the causation running
from markets to preferences, which is left for future research.
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